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Case Comment
Conflict of Laws: Minnesota Rejects the "Significant
Contacts" Doctrine in Favor of the
"Better Law" Test
Plaintiff automobile guest and defendants automobile owner
and driver, all residents of Ontario, Canada, began a day-long
shopping and pleasure trip from Ontario to Duluth, Minnesota.
'When the car went off the road in Minnesota, the plaintiff was
seriously injured. She brought suit in Minnesota against the
owner and driver of the automobile, which was registered, in-
sured, and garaged in Ontario. Because Ontario has a guest
statute requiring proof of gross negligence,' which was not al-
leged, defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and advanced the affirmative defense that the law of Ontario
should apply. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss and struck their affirmative defense.2  The Supreme
Court of Minnesota, per Todd, J., affirmed, holding that where
an accident occurs in this state, Minnesota courts should apply
Minnesota negligence law rather than another jurisdiction's
guest statute even though all the parties are residents of the
other jurisdiction and the automobile is licensed, garaged, and
insured there. Milkovich v. Saari, -Minn. -, 203 N.W.2d 408
(1973).
The traditional tort conflict-of-laws rules dictated that the
law of the place of injury governed an action.3 However, this
"lex loci" doctrine of vested rights 4 was increasingly criticized
1. Ox'_Amo REVIsED STATUTES 1970, ch. 202, § 132(3), reads:
Notwithstanding Subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor
vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carry-
ing passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or
damage from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being
carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting onto, or alighting
from a motor vehicle, except where such loss or damage was
caused or contributed to by the gross negligence of the driver
of the motor vehicle.
2. The trial court certified the question to the Supreme Court as
important and doubtful.
3. Minnesota's adherence to this doctrine was stated as recently
as Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958). The tradi-
tional rule was embodied in RESTATEmENT, CONFMCT OF LAWS § 378(1934), which specified the rule governing liability for tort as the 'qaw
of the place of wrong."
4. The vested rights doctrine treats the rights of parties to an
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as being unresponsive to the actual interests of the parties.5
The rejection of lex loci was signaled by the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Babcock v. Jackson." In holding that New
York would apply its own law to a suit between a New York
plaintiff and a New York defendant arising out of an accident in
Ontario, the New York Court of Appeals stated that it would
look to the law of the jurisdiction with the "most significant
contacts" with the occurrence and the parties. Though the court
in Babcock was unclear in its application of the "most significant
contacts" test, in a series of later cases New York courts analyzed,
explained, and finally set down guidelines interpreting Babcock
and its progeny.7 The "most significant contacts" test was to be
event as having "vested" according to the law of the place of the occur-
rence. Thus, the court hearing a suit brought on the transaction or
event merely discovers what rights and obligations were created under
the law of the state of occurrence and applies the law of that state.
See R. LELAi, CONF CT OF LAWS § 3 (1959); A. EHaENzwsio, CoNFLIcTs
IN A NUTSHELL § 6 (1965).
5. See, e.g., B. CuRRiE, SELEcTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS oF LAws
(1963); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM.
L. REv. 959 (1952); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem,
47 HAm,. L. REv. 173-208 (1933).
6. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
7. Following the 1963 decision in Babcock v. Jackson, id., New
York was faced with a case involving two New York citizens who met
while living in Colorado attending school. The car was registered, in-
sured and licensed in New York. Plaintiff guest sued in New York for
a Colorado accident and the Court of Appeals applied the Colorado
guest statute to bar the action. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965). However, the very next year
the court decided Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591,
221 N.E.2d 380 (1966). There New York residents were involved in an
accident in Ontario in a car registered, insured, and garaged in New
York. In this case the court indicated that the place where the relation-
ship originated was no longer controlling and applied New York law.
Next, a New York Supreme Court, attempting to interpret these deci-
sions, applied New York law to an accident occurring in New York
where all parties were residents of Ontario and the car was registered,
insured, and garaged in Ontario. Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992,
263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1966). In 1969, however, the Court of Appeals in Tooker v. Lopez, 24
N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969), reconsidered its de-
cision in Dym v. Gordon and applied New York law to allow recovery by
a New York plaintiff against a New York defendant for an accident which
occurred in Michigan where both parties had been residing. Based on
this new analysis, another New York Supreme Court distinguished
Kell v. Henderson on procedural grounds and applied Ontario law on
facts essentially identical to Kell in Arbuthnot v. Allbright, 35 App. Div.
2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970). In the latest pertinent New York case,
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972), the Court of Appeals ap-
plied Ontario law to bar an Ontario guest from recovering from a
New Yorker following an Ontario accident, and the court set forth
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applied not- merely by counting contacts but by finding contacts
which advanced relevant state policies."
In Baits v. Baits9 in 1966, Minnesota first followed the Bab-
cock v. Jackson test and rejected the lex loci doctrine.10 In a
companion case, Kopp v. Rechtzigel,n the court applied Minne-
sota negligence law rather than a South Dakota guest statute to
a suit between Minnesota domiciliaries' 2 even though the acci-
dent had occurred in South Dakota. In 1968, the Minnesota court
again held that Minnesota law rather than a North Dakota
guest statute governed where an accident which occurred in
North Dakota injured the plaintiff guest, a Minnesota resident1i
Similarly, in 1972 the court applied Minnesota law rather than
the guest statute of the places of injury, North Dakota and Ne-
vada, when Minnesota plaintiffs or defendants were involved,
and all parties had strong Minnesota connections.1 4 Thus by
1972 Minnesota had clearly adopted the "significant contacts"
test to determine choice of law.
In Miikovich v. Saari"5 the Minnesota court was for the first
time faced with a guest statute defense where the only contacts
with Minnesota were the occurrence of the injury and the plain-
tiff's hospitalization within the state.10 Although the Minne-
sota court had often said that it believed the Minnesota common
law to be preferable to guest statutes,17 in previous cases it had
guidelines to establish some predictability in using the Babcock v. Jack-
son approach.
8. Neumeaer v. Kuetner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
9. 273 Minn. 419,142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
10. [W]e will weigh the interests of the domiciliary state,
whether Minnesota or otherwise, to the extent it is constitu-
tionally permissible, against any peculiar concern the state of
the tort or the forum state may have. Such an approach will
reflect all of the factors relevant to the issues rather thanblindly defer to a state which may have experienced only a
trivial and transitory brush with the parties to the litigation.
273 Mni. at 426, 142 N.W.2d at 70-71 (footnote omitted).
11. 273 Minn. 441,141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
12. The car involved was registered, insured, and garaged in
Minnesota.
13. Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
14. Allen v. Gannaway, 294 Minn. 1, 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972); Bol-
grean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972).
15. - Minn. -, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
16. Milkovich was hospitalized in Duluth, Minnesota, for over a
month, but all hospital bills had been paid prior to the court's consid-
eration of the case.
17. The court noted in Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158
N.W.2d 254 (1968), that it found Minnesota law (requiring only that
ordinary negligence be proven) to be better, although it declined to
apply the North Dakota guest statute because of substantial Minnesota
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examined the contacts with the states involved in order to find
the "center of gravity" of the controversy. 18 The law of the
"center of gravity" state was then used. In Milkovich, however,
the court clearly adopted the "better law" test and concluded
that where it faced a choice of applying a guest statute or Min-
nesota common law, it would further its own "governmental in-
terests" by applying its own "better law."'19 This decision re-
flects a break with both previous Minnesota case law and the
direction of choice-of-law decisions across the country. In Milko-
vich, the Minnesota court appears to be moving away from the
"significant contacts" doctrine and signaling a return-by the
new route of application of forum law-to the rigidity charac-
teristic of the vested rights theory of lex loci.
However, the Milkovich court stated that it based its deci-
sion on a rejection of the lex loci doctrine and on an acceptance
of a "methodology of analysis. °20 This analysis rested on five
"choice-influencing considerations" enunciated by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in Clark v. Clark.2' The principles used
by the New Hampshire Court were (1) predictability of results,
(2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) sim-
plification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's
governmental interests, and (5) application of the better rule of
law. Although the Minnesota court expressly adopted these five
considerations as general guidelines, it dismissed predictability
of results as being irrelevant to tort actions. It also dismissed
simplification of the judicial task since the court could as easily
apply either the Minnesota or the Ontario rule. The court then
stated that international and interstate relations are "main-
tained without harm where, as here, the forum state has a sub-
stantial connection with the facts and issues involved. '2 2  In
connections in that case. In Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d
442 (1972), the court again refused to apply the North Dakota guest
statute and added: "The fact that we believe Minnesota has the better
law reinforces our decision." 293 Minn. at 10, 196 N.W.2d at 444.
18. Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972); Balts v.
Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966). The "center of gravity" and
"significant contacts" tests are different descriptions of the same proc-
ess.
19. 203 N.W.2d at 417. Thus what merely "reinforced" the decision
in Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972), has become
the basis for the Minnesota court's new conflicts approach.
20. Id. at 412.
21. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). These five considerations
were first proposed by Professor Robert Leflar in Choice Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 267, 279 (1966).
22. 203 N.W.2d at 417.
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the court's view, a substantial connection was present because
the accident occurred in Minnesota and the plaintiff incurred
hospital expenses in Minnesota. 23
The fourth and fifth considerations, however, were decisive.
The court held that its main "governmental interest" was that
of a "justice administering state," and thus it could not decide
cases under rules which were "inconsistent with [its] own con-
cepts of fairness and equity."24 Expressing its distaste for guest
statutes, the court found Minnesota law to be the "better law"
and thus concluded that the analysis it employed required appli-
cation of Minnesota law.
The analysis followed by the Minnesota court leads almost
invariably to the application of forum law, although it is far
from clear that such an outcome was the intention of the New
Hampshire court when it set out the five considerations in Clark
v. Clark.2 5 In Clark, the New Hampshire court did apply forum
law, but the forum was the state of residence of both plaintiff
and defendant. In discussing the five "choice-influencing con-
siderations" it pointed out several factors seemingly overlooked
by the Minnesota court.
First, the New Hampshire court agreed with the Minnesota
court that predictability of results has little relationship to au-
tomobile accident cases, but it added the caveat "except for the
evils of forum shopping."26 One of the traditional purposes of
conflict-of-laws rules has been to avoid this evil-to establish
minimum guidelines for interjurisdictional disputes to prevent
the plaintiff from being able to shop for the jurisdiction most
likely to award him damages. The Minnesota court ignored this
factor in its consideration, for it's new methodology might well be
labeled either as "forum law applies" or, more simply, "plaintiff
wins." In the instant case it is very likely that the Minnesota
suit was the result of such forum shopping. Minnesota law is
more favorable to the plaintiff than is Ontario law. Moreover,
the fact that the initiation of this suit followed the earlier fil-
ing of a suit in Ontario that was voluntarily dismissed by the
plaintiff suggests that the plaintiff recalculated her chances for
recovery and then chose Minnesota.
Second, the discussion in Clark of the consideration of main-
tenance of reasonable orderliness in interstate and international
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
26. Id. at 354, 208.
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relations indicated that real and significant contacts would be
required before the forum could apply its own law. Writing for
the New Hampshire court, Judge Kenison stated that "any choice
of law that would unduly favor one state, the forum perhaps
... would be questionable." A court should ".... apply the
law of no state which does not have substantial connection with
the total facts and with the particular issue being litigated. '27
The Minnesota court found that the occurrence of the acci-
dent and the hospitalization of the plaintiff in Minnesota gave
the state significant contacts with the case. However, the fact
that all Minnesota bills had been paid meant that there was in
fact nothing in this particular case to involve questions about
Minnesota medical creditors. The court stated, however, that
a view of only the facts of this particular case and a conclusion
that the Minnesota hospitalization was irrelevant since all bills
had been paid "might offer even minor incentives to 'hospital
shop' or . . create litigation-directed pressures on the payment
of debts to medical facilities. 2 8
The court then concluded that the likelihood of medical
costs being incurred constituted a governmental interest in the
case. This hypothetical interest leads invariably to "significant
contacts" whenever an accident occurs within the state's bor-
ders, and the court's methodology results in the application of
Minnesota law whenever Minnesota has such a significant inter-
est. Thus, while the court in Milkovich rejects the doctrine of
lex loci-that the law of the place of injury governs-its analysis
would reach the same result as invariably as the rejected rule.
Moreover, the hypothetical Minnesota interest created by the
court's desire to avoid hospital shopping or litigation-directed
pressures on payment of medical creditors ignores (1) the im-
probability of an injured accident victim's deciding which hos-
pital he will enter on the basis of applicable law, (2) the wide-
spread existence of first-party medical payments coverage in au-
tomobile liability insurance, and (3) the existence of procedures
that allow Minnesota hospitals to receive medical debt funds
from the home county of an injured non-resident. 20 Neverthe-
27. Id.
28. 203 N.W.2d at 417.
29. These procedures allow Minnesota medical creditors to be
paid by out-of-state county welfare funds. The Minnesota court ap-
pears to be concerned only about the payment of the creditors: if the
non-resident had sufficient funds to pay, payment would come from
him; if he were without funds and eligible for medical public aid
(i.e., Medicaid) from his home county, as determined by the state of his
residence, those funds would be available to Minnesota hospitals.
[Vol. 58:199
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less, the court employed this hypothetical interest as a hook on
which to hang Minnesota's interest in the outcome of the case
and to justify its use of Minnesota law.
That this decision reflects a departure from earlier case law
is illustrated by Balts v. Bats30 in which the court noted the
principal reason for the change from the vested rights approach
to the significant contacts approach:
In this day of jet planes and high speed transportation on in-
terstate highways, a traveler's contact with the state of the tort
is ordinarily quite casual compared to the substantial and en-
during interest of the domiciliary state.3 1
Thus the court in Milkovich assumed its conclusion when it
found that maintenance of interstate and international relations
was not relevant to the decision because Minnesota had signifi-
cant contacts with the events. The Milkovich court emphasized
the word "contact" and nearly ignored the word "significant."
The. court failed to analyze the nature of these contacts and to
compare them with those of Ontario and assumed that Ontario
would not be affronted by application of Minnesota law to its
residents.
The decision in Milkovich ultimately rests on a finding that
Minnesota's "governmental interests" as a "justice administering
state" will be served by applying rules consistent with its own
ideas of fairness and equity,32 and that applying the "better law"
of Minnesota is thus in its governmental interest. This merging
of the considerations of governmental interest and better law
takes place absent any real analysis of what governmental inter-
ests may be present or how they may be served by applying
Minnesota law and ignores the legitimate interest of other gov-
ernmental units in the decision.33 The only clear governmental
interest may be convenience for litigation, which arguably is not
a governmental interest of the forum state. The court's concern
30. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
31. Id. at 70.
32. The standard for "our own concept of fairness and equity"
(203 N.W.2d at 417) is not articulated. Whether this means Minnesota
legislative policy or the justices' personal views is not clear.
33. The original author of these five considerations, Robert A.
Leflar, in Conflicts Law: More Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1584 (1966), pointed out that the consideration of govern-
mental interest is not a necessary ingredient in each case, but something
the forum should look to in order to determine if it in fact has such an
interest. Leflar stated that "this refers to legitimate concerns, not just
to the local occurrence of some facts, or to the local existence of some
rule of law that could be constitutionally applied to the facts." 54
CAL L. REv. at 1586.
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with Minnesota as a "justice administering state" might imply
that the plaintiff would receive less than justice in Ontario.
Thus, the merger of governmental interest and better law oblit-
erates governmental interests as a factor and destroys any hope
of recognizing competing interests of other jurisdictions.
Moreover, such a merger amounts to a return to a broad-
ened vested rights rule in torts conflicts: if either party is do-
miciled in Minnesota and the accident occurs elsewhere, Minne-
sota has significant contacts and will apply its own better law
to further its governmental interests; and if the accident occurs
in Minnesota, that fact gives Minnesota significant contacts to
apply its own better law to further its governmental interest.
Under the Milkovich doctrine, only if Minnesota were a truly
neutral forum state, having no connection with the events other
than as forum, could Minnesota possibly apply any law but that
of Minnesota.34  Conflicts rules are simply not made for this
infrequent occurrence. The doctrine of lex loci did not lead
as inexorably to the application of a single state's law.
Even if the Minnesota court had heeded all of Judge Keni-
son's warnings accompanying his five considerations, and even
if it had more thoroughly analyzed the role of governmental in-
terests and "better law," serious questions might nevertheless
be raised about the advisability of the modes of analysis em-
ployed. The most serious concern is centered around the so-
called "better law" approach. One conflicts scholar, Russell
Weintraub,3" has suggested that the better law consideration be
encouraged, but only if two conditions have clearly been met.
First, there must be a true conflict of policies underlying the
law of each state; and each state's domestic law must be sig-
34. In Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968),
the Wisconsin court applied Wisconsin law in a fact situation similar to
Milkovich. In Conklin the Wisconsin court analyzed its interest as theforum state in such a way that it appeared that its connection as forum
gave it sufficient contacts to apply its own law. The Minnesota court
in Milkovich relied heavily on Conklin v. Horner, although it did not
adopt the language concerning its role as purely forum. The Wisconsin
court's approach in Conklin v. Homer could raise due process questions
in application of forum law where no other connection with the state
exists. The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that if
the connection with the forum state were too slight or casual, the ap-
plication of local law would not be consistent with due process. See
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-182 (1964); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Company v. Delta & Pine Land Company, 292
U.S. 143 (1934); Home Insurance Company v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).




nificantly and legitimately advanced by application of its own
law.3 6 In a discussion of this requirement, Weintraub analyzed
the Wisconsin case of Conklin v. Horner,s 7 a case consistent with
Milkovich and relied upon by the Minnesota court. Weintraub
found Wisconsin's interest in application of its own law to be
"officious and hypothetical." 38  Chief Justice Hallow's dissent
in Conklin v. Homer observed that the method adopted by the
court is essentially a mechanical application of the law of the
forum.n9
Second, Weintraub argued that the better law should be
selected by objective standards, and states should not declare
another state's law to be anachronistic unless it can be shown
that many jurisdictions have abandoned the rule in question
over a period of time in favor of the "better law" of the forum. 40
As a number of commentaries have noted, the fact that 27 states
and several foreign jurisdictions have some form of guest statute
makes it highly questionable whether guest statutes can be con-
sidered anachronistic. 41 In addition, while the Milkovich court
indicated why it believed a guest statute not to be good law, it
never affirmatively showed why negligence law is better. If a
court intends to apply a better law standard, it should be able
to show affirmatively why the law applied is in fact the better
law.
The most basic question raised about the better law doctrine
is simply its relevance to conflicts decisions at all. One conflicts
scholar4 2 views the better law approach as an escape, a means
by which courts can avoid coming to grips with the difficulties
of finding reasonable and workable solutions to conflicts prob-
lems. The better law doctrine was expressly rejected by the
New York Court of Appeals in its most recent conflicts decision,
Neurneier v. Kuehner:43
36. Id.
37. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
38. WEmINtAuB, supra note 35, at 246.
39. 38 Wis. 2d 491, 157 N.W.2d 590; see also Note, Wisconsin's Torts
Conflicts-Genesis of a Rule, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 924.
40. WEmTRAUB, supra note 35.
41. Id. at 206. 25 states now have guest statutes, and Massa-
chusetts and Georgia have imposed the standard judicially. How-
ever, Vermont repealed its guest statute in 1970. Vt. Laws 1970, CIL
194. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court recently declared the
California guest statute to be unconstitutional in part. Brown v. Merlo,
8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
42. Cavers, Conflict of Laws Round Table, the Value of Principled
Preferences, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 211 (1971).
43. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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While New York may be a proper forum for actions involving
its own domiciliaries, regardless of where the accident hap-
pened, it does not follow that we should apply New York law
simply because some may think it is a better rule, where doing
so does not advance any New York State interest, nor the in-
terest of any New York State domiciliary. 44
The use of the better law approach also raises grave juris-
prudential questions such as whether courts should perform the
function of deciding which law embodies the better social pol-
icy. Once a state or provincial legislature has chosen a social
policy for its residents, it is hardly the court's role in a conflicts
case to then judge whether that state's social policy is better
than another's.
While certain courts and scholars would criticize the reason-
ing in Milkovich but justify the result on other grounds,4" the
better analysis would reject the decision and apply Ontario law.
The clearest expression of this view comes from the New York
Court of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner.46  Setting forth
guidelines for the application of Babcock v. Jackson's "significant
contacts" approach, Chief Judge Fuld's first guideline clearly cov-
ers the Milkovich facts:
1) When the guest passenger and the host driver are domiciled
in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that
state should control or determine the standard of care which
the host owes to his guest. 47
This guideline is justified by the basic thrust of the Babcock
approach, which is to apply the law of the state which has the
most significant contacts with the events. The guideline identi-
fies those contacts which the court considers significant because
they are related to the policies of the state in formulating its
laws.
The significant contacts or "center of gravity" approach is
close to the "functional analysis"' 48 in which the forum state at-
tempts to ascertain if the apparent conflict is a true or a spuri-
ous one. If the policies of only one state would be significantly
44. Id. at 126-27, at 457, at 68.
45. See, e.g., Rosenberg & Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Hen-
derson-An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 459 (1967).
46. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
47. Id. at 128, at 457, at 70. This decision was not considered by the
Minnesota court, and the court in fact predicted that the New York Court
of Appeals would adopt Kell v. Henderson, which is in fact reversed by
this guideline. See note 7 supra.
48. See WEImAuB, supra note 35.
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and legitimately advanced by application of its law, the conflict
is spurious and the forum should apply the law of the state
whose policies would be thus advanced. In the instant case the
conflict is spurious, for only Ontario has policies which would
be advanced by application of its guest statute40 and Minnesota
would be officiously interfering to apply its own law where no
policy of its own would be advanced.50
Similarly, application of the rules of RESTATEMENT SEC-
OND, CONI'ICT OF LAWS would result in the choice of Ontario
law rather than Minnesota law in the instant case. The Restate-
ment provides that:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.51
The rapid changes in torts conflict-of-laws in the past decade
have led a number of courts to confusing and inconsistent deci-
sions, some of which are only beginning to be clarified by fur-
ther case law. The absence of rules and adoption of forms of
analysis and methodology help to generate problems which will
be settled only as the new approaches become more stable and
widely accepted.
The Minnesota court in Milkovich had left behind at least
49. Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 358 (1936),
indicates that a major consideration behind passage of the guest statute
was to protect insurance companies from the fraud of insured motorists.
Since Ontario motorists and insurers are involved in the instant case,
the policy behind the legislation is clearly applicable. The Ontario
guest statute was amended in 1966 to allow recovery for gross negli-
gence rather than to bar recovery entirely. Highway Traffic Amend-
ment Act, 1966, ch. 64, § 20(2) (Ont.).
50. With no Minnesota resident, insurance company, or medical
creditor involved (see text accompanying note 29 supra), Minnesota has
no interest other than as forum, which is insufficient under this analysis.
51. REsTATEET SEcoND, CoNFLcT oF LAws § 145 (1967). Sec-
tion 6 states:
Choice of Law Principles:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow
a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to
the choice of the applicable law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of results, and




temporarily its "center of gravity" and "significant contacts"
approach for a methodology which in fact results in as much
oversimplification as the doctrine of lex loci. While Milkovich
creates predictability, it achieves this end only by sacrificing the
principle of accommodating the most interested jurisdiction. As
long as the entire area of torts conflicts is still in flux, it is pos-
sible that the court will redefine its position and move back to
the "significant contacts" approach of Babcock v. Jackson.52 Un-
til such a time, Minnesota courts, in obedience to Milkovich,
presumably will follow the simplistic rule of applying Minne-
sota law in all cases.
52. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
[Vol. 58:199
